Here’s an economics lesson for the American serviceman. Reach into your pocket and pull out a dollar bill. Its value isn’t set by gold or any precious metal, only law and world currency markets determine its worth. Why, then, would someone buy mere paper not backed by a tangible asset? For the same reason you might buy stock in a company. Foreigners buy our dollars because they know America has the greatest return on investment of any endeavor in history.

Historically, America is where the world’s smart money runs in troubled times. But now America finds itself in hard times. No longer a manufacturing giant, we’re now a consumer economy shouldering crippling public and private debt. The US is hemorrhaging trillions in real estate and corporate wealth while embroiled in two expensive wars. A 2007 BBC survey found America’s standing abroad ranking only above Israel, North Korea and Iran. With all this gloom, does the world’s smart money still consider America a safe bet?

Absolutely, and the US serviceman has something to do with it.

Since the early 1990s America led the way building the post-Cold War global economy, an international free trade system. For better or worse, the United States is the lynchpin holding it all together. When the world buys our dollars and debt they essentially cast a vote of confidence not only in America, but the global economic system we helped establish. This is true, even during the current crisis, due in large part to the US military.

Defense critics point out the US spends more on defense than the next 14 nations combined. True, but we also directly or indirectly protect those 14 nations’ access to international trade. From Bangkok to Baghdad, international merchants know goods and services flow unhindered because of US military power. This arrangement benefits our friends and rivals alike. China, the world’s manufacturing superpower, exported $1.2 trillion in goods last year, but China doesn’t protect the international trade routes on which she so strongly depends. Nor is it African ships leading the charge against pirates off Somalia or OPEC armies guaranteeing the flow of oil through the volatile Persian Gulf region. It’s the American fighting man and woman who keep global trade free.

Foreign nations may rail against US military power in public, but privately they vote with their money. They understand two important facts: our forces operate with immense restraint and in strict adherence to law; and no international coalition can yet match America’s military prowess. Would China act with our humanity and restraint? Can the U.N. match our decisiveness and competence should they become protectors of the global economy? This is why, rhetoric aside, the world trusts us to protect the global market.

For this reason our leaders must tread carefully. Recently, Rep. Barney Frank (D-Mass) called for a 25% cut in the defense budget. One lesson the financial crisis taught us is risk assumed by one global player is risk assumed by all. If America can’t or won’t protect the global trade system our national stock will surely go down. Investors will take their money elsewhere and other nations will fill the power vacuum we leave behind. What will our dollars and debt be worth then?

The 21^stcentury US Military isn’t just protecting our homeland or hunting down terrorists, but ensuring the global economy remains free.  If you’re an American serviceman reading this, you truly hold that dollar in your hands. It isn’t backed by gold...

...It’s backed by steel. 

I wish to thank Redhead over at Redheads and Rednecks for pointing me to the story. Thanks Red!

If you’re interested, check out what I’ve written on this subject in these early blogs and published articles.

Process Over Purpose

Time Wasted

Tinkering at the Edge of Greatness

This weekend and over the next month they’ll send their high-powered lobbyist to gain assurances from their pet senators and congressmen that their key programs will remain safe from any future cuts.  Our legislators will try to put on their best face and tell them all is well. All the while they’ll quietly send their staffers to the Pentagon...Those staffers will tell the Pentagon budget planners…to start planning deep cuts. They’ll give these planners draconian bottom lines and tell them to meet them - period...Over the next few months rumors of the deep budget cuts will seep outside the Pentagon. Small programs, big programs – nothing will be sacred...The Air Force will get hit hardest since it’s currently the least favored branch among the political elites.... Don’t hold your breath on a new replacement rescue helicopter...Expect early retirement for various weapons systems...

Let’s see where we stand one month and over a trillion dollars later:

(Leaders) will assure defense contractors defense spending will remain strong: According to Rueters, "U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gateson Tuesday struck an upbeat note about the future outlook for U.S. defense spending, citing strong bipartisan support for U.S. national security goals." 

Deep defense cuts: I guess Sec. Gates hasn't been talking to the movers and shakers in the upcoming Democratic congressional super-majority. Two weeks ago this story hit the papers:  "After the November election, Democrats will push for a second economic stimulus package that includes money for the states' stalled infrastructure projects, along with help paying for healthcare expenses, food stamps and extended unemployment benefits, U.S. Rep. Barney Frank said Thursday...(He) also called for a 25 percent cut in military spending, saying the Pentagon has to start choosing from its many weapons programs..."

Congress is already looking for offsets to pay for the bailout and stimulus packages.

 'Big programs, small programs, nothing will be sacred'…expect early retirement for various weapon systems’: According to Inside Defense and the Air Force Times, the service will cut over 300 frontline fighter aircraft by 2010, almost a decade ahead of schedule. This is about 15% of the services fighter force, significant by any standard.

Don’t hold your breath on a new rescue helicopter:  On 23 October the Washington Times reported the Air Force postponed awarding the CSAR-X helicopter until sometime next year, leaving it for the next presidential administration. The tanker is also now delayed until the next administration is seated.

1. After the election the Pentagon likely faces an openly hostile congress and administration in time of active war. Rep. Barney Frank’s 25% cut comment is a clear message of things to come.
2. Never has the Pentagon had to maintain a sustained forward force posture and active combat operations while America was so deep in debt (public and private).
3. Never has so much of that debt been held by potential hostile powers. He who holds the debt makes the rules.
4. Never has America experienced a deep recession as a consumer, not manufacturing or farming, economy. The Pentagon keeps many of America’s remaining heavy industry on life support, what happens to them in a shrinking economy and lower defense spending is uncertain.
5. The Pentagon has yet to factor in the new realities of global free trade into its acquisitions or defense posture. Its current budgeting and acquisitions framework hasn’t fundamentally changed since America was a creditor nation and General Motors ruled the world.
6. Never has the Pentagon had to rely of foreign sources, many potentially hostile for three critical items: funding (via investment in US debt), energy, and critical technologies. This is the true national security issue of our time.
7. What happens if we enter a period of increased inflation due to our current massive bailout and stimulus spending? This is a real possibility. A severely weakened dollar will discourage foreign (i.e. Chinese) investment in the debt & dollar. Inflation makes everything more expensive – like fuel for fighter jets or computer chips for guidance systems. A defense budget passed one year may assume a 5% inflation rate, but face 10% inflation when executed. Though the government doesn’t officially factor it in, energy is one of the biggest drivers for actual inflation.
8. Never has the Pentagon had to rely on an all-volunteer force during times of sustained combat operations. This has resulted in enormous personnel costs for a relatively small force. The only good news here is a poor economy makes for good recruiting and gives the Pentagon more flexibility in reigning in benefits.

All of these factors will come into play in the next 24 months and beyond to reshape how America defends herself and her global interests. I won’t venture anymore predictions other than hold on…its going to be a bumpy ride.

The Defense Department wants a rocket ship. Defense planners state we have a valid requirement to blast a small force of troops anywhere on planet earth in less than two hours. According to the 17 October edition of Stars and Stripes

Civilian and military officials held a two-day conference at the National Security Space Office (NSSO) to plan development of the Small Unit Space Transport and Insertion — or SUSTAIN — program…the Marines (need) the "capability to transport small, mission-tailored units through space from any point on the globe to a contingency at any other point on the globe" within minutes of an order, the paper reported, sourcing to a Marine document…Private rocket pioneer Burt Rutan says the plan is technologically possible, “…This has never been done," Rutan told USA Today in an e-mail. "However, it is feasible. It would be a relatively expensive way to get the troops on the ground, but it could be done."

I was just wondering if the Defense Department could invent a rocket ship to bring these “civilian and military officials” from the NSSO back to Planet Earth. If the Pentagon is struggling to acquire more terrestrial, conventional weapons systems how can it hope to build a “Buzz Lightyear” system like this?  

For example, the Air Force takes 20 years just to field new fighters like the F-22. It’s failed to acquire a new aerial tanker after a decade of trying. It took both the Marines and Air Force over 20 years to field the V-22 Osprey, the tilt-rotor aircraft. The Marine’s current new version of the venerable H-1 Huey, the UH-1Y, just entered service with severe performance limitations to the irritation of John Young, the Undersecretary of Acquisitions. According to Inside the Pentagon, Young commented on the likelihood that DOD would have to pay roughly $72 million to fix the UH-1Y’s major deficiency even though the problem prevents the aircraft from maneuvering as required. This was just a Huey upgrade program, the ancient and relatively simple helicopter of Vietnam fame. The Marines aren’t the only ones having problems buying helicopters. The Air Force is still unsuccessful in its half-decade old quest to buy a common, off-the-shelf helicopter to replace its 1980-era H-60s. The Army, perhaps the leading authority in military helicopters, just had the $6.2 billion Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter program cancelled by Secretary Young. The Bell ARH-70, designed to replace the 40 year old OH-58 Kiowa scout helicopter, was 40% over-budget and underperformed.

Helicopters and airplanes are not ‘rocket science’ - NASA’s area of expertise. Has anyone in the DoD talked to them lately? Their Orion spacecraft, an Apollo rehash, is delayed again. From 2010 to 2015 American astronauts will hitch rides with our dear and old friends the Russians. NASA is the world’s leader in rockets and they’re having a hard time getting its “retro” rocket into space; and the Pentagon is seriously entertaining the idea of fielding something this cutting edge beyond the atmosphere?  

It’s funny they call this rocket ship “SUSTAIN,” because we’re having a heck of a time just trying to sustain the run-of-the-mill weapons systems we already have. This week the Air Force announced it will cut a massive portion of its frontline fighter force, about 300 fighters including F-15s, F-16s and A-10s, by 2010. The money will be used to sustain other current programs, including manpower. There’s a technical term for this: cannibalization. The Navy announced it is cutting the purchase of one of its much needed half-billion dollar littoral combat ships, citing budget issues. The new Hollow Force is starting to take shape, and this is before the emerging budget crisis really kicks into gear.  

According to the 17 October The Washington Times: 

The spiraling financial crisis and the ballooning costs of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan will force U.S. military planners to make hard choices about defense spending, which has risen at unprecedented levels since 2001, defense officials and experts say…Jeremy Potter, a senior analyst for federal industry with the government contractor consulting group INPUT, said the full impact of the bailout´s cost would not be felt until fiscal 2010, which begins next Oct. 1…A year from now, "defense program managers are going to be scrambling to get their programs funded," he said.

I know, some of you thinking, “Hey, it was just a meeting, it doesn’t mean we’re serious about building a new rocket.” I think even entertaining the concept shows the lack of serious focus within the Pentagon about where we find ourselves:

The services are starting to cannibalize mainstay programs, the Pentagon can’t buy new weapons systems with the money it already has, money for future force modernization is drying up, and the threats to our nation are growing stronger.

There, I just boiled America’s strategic military position down to one sentence. I, the military equivalent to Joe The Plumber, just did what all the brass, consultants, and think tanks in the Beltway can’t or won’t do. Everything the Pentagon does, every penny it spends, should exist within this strategic prism. Building a multi-billion dollar rocket to throw a platoon from one side of the planet to the other is about as far outside this box as one can get. It’s dangerous because it shows our friends and adversaries an unnerving lack of focus within our defense establishment.

Its time to get serious.

Few alive can recall when our nation faced such unsettling times. Servicemen watch the financial turmoil battering our nation with grave interest. Obviously, their most immediate concerns are how the crisis affects their wallets. However, in recent days I’ve been approached by concerned young officers asking, “How will this impact the military?” They’ve been at war for years and now another level of uncertainty has been dropped upon them. They understand the military doesn’t exist in a vacuum and are hungry for straight answers.

The straight answer is the budget outlook is grim, won’t get any better, and it will effect defense.

The short term outlook is dark. According to February 2008 Office of Management and Budget (OMB) estimates, the government took in about $2.6 trillion and spent about $2.9 trillion.  That resulted in an annual deficit of almost $300 billion dollars, or roughly the equivalent of half the defense budget. Add that to America’s growing 10 trillion dollar debt, a conservative estimate. (It’s important to note these OMB figures assumed a healthy economy and unemployment under 5%.)

Those February assumptions are now worthless. The feds just spent over $850 billion of money it doesn’t have to save the global economy. Unemployment raced to 6.1% and most agree we’re heading into, at minimum, a deep recession. Tax revenues will fall and the pool of money available for the federal government to borrow will shrink in the face of the deepening global credit crisis. This year’s deficit has doubled and may top one trillion dollars before all is said and done. This bodes ill for a nation at war.

The Pentagon budget would face substantial challenges even in the best of times. The Navy and Air Force are struggling to modernize Cold War era equipment while the Army and Marines must grow and replace equipment worn out by a decade of combat. Healthcare costs are rapidly eroding the defense budget from within. Seldom has the need for defense dollars been so great, nor has the budget outlook been so bleak.

The long term outlook is even darker.

Many in the military have never heard of Mr. David Walker. He was U.S. Comptroller General under Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush.  As America’s former senior bookkeeper his message to America is simple: we’re way over our head in debt, it’s getting worse, and time is running out. Here’s why.

If one took the 3 trillion federal budget and condensed it into one dollar, defense spending would be about 20 cents. Mandatory spending, mostly interest on the national debt and entitlements, take about 50 cents; by law these take precedence over everything else, including defense. Starting in 2010 mandatory spending will begin to devour the entire dollar until, somewhere between 2020 and 2030, there will be no revenue left over for defense or anything else. Even worse, these OMB estimates are based on rosy economic forecasts and don’t account for anything approaching the scale of our current crisis.

I believe global economics and the colossal pressures on the federal budget are the true defense issues of our generation. Our entire strategic outlook must revolve around this new reality. Leaders of every service should level with us about the impact these challenges will present in the coming years.

According to CQ.com the Pentagon wants $450 billion in more spending over the next five years:

The new estimate, which has not been publicly released, would raise the fiscal 2010 budget number announced by the administration this year from $527 billion to $584 billion, not counting operations costs for the ongoing wars. 

Experts note that releasing such documents in the twilight of an administration is a well-worn tactic, and that incoming presidents often disregard such guidance in order to pursue their own priorities…

But the numbers also seem to contradict the National Defense Strategy released recently by Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, which called for tough tradeoffs in spending in an environment of limited resources…

The numbers also contradict reality. America is hemorrhaging wealth and the tax base will not support increased federal spending – defense or otherwise. The only way to raise new revenue is to borrow it or print it. Either option is bad news for inflation, interest rates and jobs.

I fully stand by my analysis Pentagon planners are most likely conducting serious budget cutting drills in expectations of massive roll-backs in discretionary spending in next budget cycle. My assessment is backed up by a 9 October Miami Herald news story:

With the U.S. economy in crisis and military spending at its highest level since World War II, military officials and experts are worrying that America may have to start reining in defense spending…

Eight years of borrowing to pay for the Iraq and Afghan wars, coupled with an aging baby boomer population, growing healthcare costs and a push to enlarge the Army could force legislators to make tough decisions about which needs should take priority, and the next president to reassess how much the military can do…Congress' decision earlier this month to approve a $700 billon bailout for the financial industry adds to the strain on the federal budget, and the stock market decline and the credit crunch could slow economic activity and eliminate jobs, which in turn could reduce tax revenues.

Pay close attention to the sentence “push to enlarge the Army.” If they Army adds 30,000 soldiers over the next 24 months as originally planned I believe the Pentagon will slice portions of the Air Force and Navy to pay for it. The only other place to find additional cash is medical and retirement benefits…and congress won’t let that happen

Air Force modernization and re-capitalization is about to come to a sudden and brutal halt.  

Entitlements have not drained the economy because they drained the only part of federal spending that Washington was willing to reduce: defense. This was endurable because conventional threats were decreasing - primarily due to a strong defense commitment. However, as Sept. 11 demonstrated, reduction can not be an indefinite exercise.

...Despite a tax system more onerous than anyone now is willing to countenance, the taxes raised are insufficient to sustain entitlements and the rest of the federal budget...

...For many the entitlement tidal wave is a new story. In fact, it is merely the retelling of an old one. Both stories reach the same conclusion: uncontrolled spending. There is no longer a silent spending cut to offset entitlements and even the most draconian of tax codes and tax levels can not produce enough revenue to support it and the rest of the federal government.

(Author's Note: I printed Part 4 prior to Part 5 for various reasons. If you are not associated with the military this may be a bit too technical. If you are associated with the military, however, any feedback would be greatly appreciated. (please!)  - Bull_67)  

   “America’s not funding us to be a large Air Force anymore.”- Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne, 19 September 2007

The Air Force is simultaneously getting smaller and busier. In doing so it's entering uncharted territory. Or is it really uncharted territory? For the Airmen who serve in low density/high demand (LDHD) weapon systems, smaller and busier has been ‘ops normal’ for some time.

In the late 1990s the Air Force concluded it lacked enough of certain weapon systems to adequately fill the new Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) deployment structure. These systems, which came to be known as LDHD, operate under different pressures and conditions than ‘right sized’ forces. As a result, observable behaviors and characteristics unique to these communities have emerged over time. In this paper, I lay out eleven of these unique traits.

These traits provide a vocabulary for awareness and understanding of why LDHD systems emerge, perpetuate, and behave in certain ways. This paper provides some tools for managing short term effects in LDHD organizations, and explores the implications of having significant numbers of weapon systems exhibiting these traits within the Air Force. 

Officially designated LDHD forces are figuratively the ‘canary in the coal mine’ . As the Air Force continues to ‘right size’ and taskings mount, Airmen should pay closer attention and draw lessons from what their LDHD brethren are experiencing.  

LDHD Defined.

 The Air Expeditioary Force(AEF) structure organizes forces around capabilities and provides deployment predictability, and fairness. Originally, it called for 90 days of temporary duty every 15 months.   In some cases, there were not enough of some systems to supply every AEF. These LDHD forces were called enablers.   The Joint Staff has officially recognized LDHD weapon systems since 1996  and attempted to manage them with the Global Military Force Policy (GMFP). This policy requires war fighting commanders request needed capabilities, not specific platforms. Annually, each service nominates its systems to be defined as LDHD under GMFP.

According to law:

 “High-demand, low-density military capability (forces are) combat, combat support or service support capability, unit, system, or occupational specialty that the Secretary of Defense determines has funding, equipment, or personnel levels that are substantially below the levels required to fully meet or sustain actual or expected operational requirements set by regional commanders.”

 This explanation says we don’t have enough, but enough of what? The Air Force has acknowledged several LDHD weapons systems, including RC-135 Rivet Joint, E-8 JSTARS, U-2, E-3 AWACS, HH-60G, and AC-130.

AEF deployments have increased to 120 days every 20 months and the force is still shrinking.With this in mind, many non-LDHD commanders will say they don’t have enough assets to do their mission. This alone, however, doesn’t make a weapon system LDHD.

11 Traits of an LDHD Force.

1. LDHD forces do not emerge by design, but underestimating demand, not providing adequate resources, or through management.

LDHD forces arise unintentionally, whether from underestimated demand, under-allocated resources, mismanaged programs, or a combination of all three. The most important thing to understand about demand is it an uncontrollable variable. ‘Density’ results from policy, programming and budgeting decisions, but ‘demand’ lies with the actions of our adversaries. Therefore, demand is often poorly forecast. The impact may not be apparent for years until events force a reassessment of accepted assumptions. Density is defined, demand depends.

Under-allocated resources are perhaps the most common reason LDHD forces emerge. Budgets are cut, programs are delayed, production lines prematurely close - the list goes on.

Sometimes LDHD systems emerge because they are mismanaged. A timely example is the F-22 Raptor. The Air Force states it requires over 381 planes. Policy makers concluded 183 will suffice.   Either senior Air Force officials have grossly miscalculated demand by a factor of two or an LDHD weapon system has been born; only time will tell.

Policymakers recognize there are not enough of these forces but choose to perpetuate the status quo.  

If a system is recognizably in short supply one would logically assume policymakers would act quickly to increase force strength. Unfortunately, in today’s grim budget realities this is not always true. Instead, policy makers often choose not to increase forces to meet demands. They may plan force increases, but don’t follow through. This usually remains the case until some event forces the issue.

The F-22 Raptor example applies here as well. Senior policymakers, not the Air Force, are quite satisfied with only 183 aircraft. However, the recent F-15 crash due to structural cracks resulted in the indefinite grounding of 40% of the F-15 fleet. This one event turned a normal mission area, air superiority/air dominance, into an LDHD mission area overnight. The status quo changed and may have reopened the case for buying new Raptors.

Most weapon systems can avoid from falling into the LDHD trap by policy makers consciously addressing traits 1 & 2. 

2. LDHD weapons systems are expensive, highly capable platforms which are few in numbers and difficult, if not impossible, to replace.  

LDHD systems fall into two broad categories: antiques and exotics.

Antiques are no longer built. Like a classic car, once wrecked it’s gone forever; and just like an old car, sustainment becomes increasingly expensive. Updating antique systems is also very expensive. For example, the C-5 fleet is undergoing upgrade and life extension modifications at a current cost of $83 million per aircraft.  If not replaced in a timely manner, right-sized antique systems may become LDHD through wear and tear. The recent F-15 grounding is not the only example of this. The C-130 fleet instantly, if temporarily, became an LDHD asset when in 2005 about 100 C-130Es where grounded due to wing cracks. 

While exotics may have open production lines, they’re so expensive or complex they are only built at low rates.  For example, it takes 30 months to make a single F-22. If we quickly needed another 180 F-22s we wouldn’t get them for quite some time. 

Antiques and exotic numbers are static or cannot be quickly surged. They may not be classified as LDHD for current requirements but may quickly become LDHD in the event of unexpected and sustained contingencies. As we will see, this contributes to trait.  

3. When increasing resources or decreasing demands is not possible, LDHD forces compensate in other ways. 

Translation: Doing more with less.

LDHD compensatory behavior occurs at the highest levels. GMFP itself is a compensatory measure. It establishes a protocol to help manage the personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO) of highly tasked units.    Like other compensatory measures, it eases the pain but doesn’t fix the underlying problem.

The Air Force often compensates in lieu of aggressively increasing numbers of LDHD weapon systems. To gain efficiencies with the service devises other options such as increasing simulator capability and capacity, increasing manpower-to-platform ratios, using suitable substitutes, using retention tools such as bonuses, and using more reserve forces.   Efficiency is generally a good thing but can sometimes have unintended consequences, as we will see when reserves are routinely used as operational forces. I will discuss this more under trait 10.

Management tools such as Total Quality Management and Lean processes naturally gain momentum in LDHD organizations. In many cases these programs are successful, resulting in smaller but more capable forces.

An emerging compensatory behavior is outsourcing to private contractors. While a mainstay for missions like logistics support and security, this phenomenon is just starting to creep into air operations.  We have yet to see long term consequences. 

Unfortunately, proponents of efficiency processes forget that the military, unlike industry, has very different funding processes. Industry can better flex to dynamic market realities and tap new resources. Militaries, however, exist within government budgeting realities. In government, the reward for doing more with less is getting less to do more.

Another compensatory behavior is leveraging new technologies to increase the performance of existing forces. Stealth and information technology are two good examples. The downside is that these forces become very expensive. This is a driving factor in trait 3 and contributes to traits 5, 6, and 7.

4. LDHD forces rely on precision (or precision-effects) instead of mass.

As LDHD forces become more sophisticated and efficient, they come to rely on precision effects instead of using mass to achieve desired outcomes. AFDD-1 defines “precision engagement” as the ability to command, control, and employ forces to cause specific strategic, operational, or tactical effects.

Precision and survivability are inseparable. The more effective a given weapon system is, the fewer are needed. This means not only are fewer munitions required to achieve the desired effect, but fewer platforms are required to reach the objective. If fewer are needed, then fewer are bought and retained. When combined with trait 4, this drives LDHD systems into downward spirals to the point where mass is no longer an option. Precision/precision-effect is no longer just one of many tools, it’s the only option. The weapon system becomes too rare and expensive to accept any losses. Systems such as the E-3, E-8 and the B-2 fit this description.

Originally, the Air Force planned to buy 132 B-2 Spirit bombers. As originally designed, it had only half the ‘precision’ equation, survivability, as it could only deliver non-precision conventional bombs or nuclear weapons.  Eventually, only 21 B-2s entered service.  Now the Spirit can deliver precision guided munitions, adding precision to survivability. With only 21 bombers, the B-2 cannot achieve mass as a delivery platform. In other words, if for some reason its stealth capability were compromised it could not use strength of numbers to reach its objective. Precision and survivability are the only options. 

AFDD-1 also says, “Mass is an effect that air and space forces achieve through effectiveness of attack, not just (emphasis added) overwhelming numbers.” Yes, but sometimes mass means just that, overwhelming numbers.

Trait 5 logically combines with trait 3 to create the next trait.  

6. LDHD forces are not optimized for defensive operations.  

LDHD forces are delicate, they lack mass (as measured by sheer numbers of weapons platforms) and depth (as measured by the ability sustain and regenerate losses).

LDHD weapons systems create LDHD, or narrow, training pipelines and logistics chains. They are pared and tailored to meet the needs of small communities with few platforms. Training pipelines are discussed further under trait 8.

These forces have narrow logistics chains since they are few in number, such as exotics. In the case of antiques, they are no longer built and any production is limited to component replacement parts. At this point trait 4 becomes a factor. Logistical compensatory behavior seeks to shift supply costs to commercial suppliers through strategic sourcing initiatives such as direct-vendor delivery and vendor-managed inventory. These techniques reduce inventory costs by reducing inventories themselves, relying on “just in time” deliveries. Traditionally, large military inventories protect against uncertainty by forming a strategic reserve. These practices yield measurable savings, but remove mass from logistic chains, making them even more narrow and susceptible to external forces out of military planners’ control. 

Unfortunately, this very narrowness makes these systems easier to target. They are few in number and often consolidated in centralized locations. Centralization and narrowness combine to present fewer “critical nodes” for potential enemies to target. Antique weapon systems are critical nodes as adversaries need only target the system itself.  Worse yet, narrowness and centralization make LDHD weapon systems uncomfortably susceptible to weapons of mass destruction. 

 LDHD platforms are sometimes lynchpin systems, or critical enablers for other non-LDHD weapon systems. Most C2ISR systems, like the E-3 AWACS, are examples of this. When a lynchpin system is lost it can simultaneously and seriously degrade numerous other systems.

Age is a threat. Being delicate, LDHD forces are highly susceptible to random events. The F-15 and C-130 examples show how unexpected technical problems can be just as disastrous as enemy action. Nature can also inflict disproportionate damage on an LDHD force, such as a tornado sweeping across a ramp of irreplaceable antiques.  

LDHD forces cannot sustain losses; they fare poorly in defensive operations or attrition warfare. They make enticing targets for potential adversaries and are susceptible to Murphy’s Law.

7. LDHD forces are inherently offensive in nature.  

If a force is not best suited for defense it had better be good at offense. Weapon systems achieving precision-effects and emphasizing platform-based survivability are, by nature, good at taking the fight to the enemy.  In other words, the more survivable a given platform, the better suited it is to attack. This is a natural outcome of traits 4 and 5, which create effective and efficient weapon systems. They are ‘born to attack,’ or enable other systems to attack. This may be why the Air Force, which believes airpower is inherently offensive, has many LDHD systems.  This, however, is only half of the offensive equation.

Being delicate, LDHD forces may not survive an attack and still be viable. Traits 3 and 6 reinforce the old cliché the best defense is a good offense. Since LDHD forces are not suited for sustained conflicts or attrition combat, adversaries must be defeated in short order.  Optimally, these forces are best used preemptively.  

8. LDHD personnel are highly trained specialists requiring extensive training and are difficult to replace.

As briefly mentioned in trait 6, LDHD forces have narrow training pipelines. They cannot readily surge to meet increased personnel demands.

First, they’ve been tailored to meet smaller production quotas. LDHD weapon systems breed LDHD training units.

Second, they are often highly selective, draw from small pools of qualified candidates who are subjected to long periods of expensive training, and possibly have high washout rates. Special operations forces are good examples.

Third, because they are part of an LDHD community, there’s no excess of platforms or personnel. Training surges usually occur during contingencies, when aircrew and aircraft are needed in the field. It’s therefore unlikely that training units will get additional resources when they need them most. This scenario played out in the buildup to OIF, when there where no E-3 AWACS to spare. During that time, when training was critically needed, no extra aircraft were available.  

Trait 8 stands apart from trait 6 due to its dynamic relationship with the next trait.  

9. LDHD forces have greater difficulty retaining personnel.

High workload is a natural result of high demand. There are many ways to measure workload, one of which is PERSTEMPO, the amount of time personnel engage in duties that preclude spending off-duty time at home station. However, workload is not a good indicator of an LDHD weapon system. First, there isn’t a standard PERSTEMPO definition agreed upon by all the services. Second, most commanders probably think their units are overworked. 

Wouldn’t high workload impact retention? The answer is yes. A 1999 RAND study found “further additions of long or hostile duty…incrementally reduce(d) reenlistment propensity…” If such a relationship exists then shouldn’t there be an objective metric? Follow the money. 

Weapon systems with high levels of career fields receiving reenlistment and retention bonuses are probably LDHD. For example, 27% of the enlisted career specialties receiving selective reenlistment bonuses are associated with LDHD systems, such as flight engineer, pararescue, and airborne battle manager.  In fact, retirees and reserve component members from LDHD weapon systems can switch to active duty and earn a hefty bonus. Another indicator is the presence of mandatory retention measures to prevent members from separating or retiring.

There are always exceptions. Some stressed units have good retention. Intangibles, like unit esprit de corps, can keep people in the fight when incentives can’t.

Combined, traits 8 and 9 indicate brittleness unique to LDHD forces.  Their training pipelines are narrow, they cannot effectively surge when necessary, and they have difficulty retaining people. Simply put, if you use them too much, you’ll break them.

10. LDHD forces have fewer reserves of equipment and personnel; if they exist, they are operational reserves.  

“It's [active component] simply too shortly manned to do the many tasks that are out there and do them in a way that doesn't put stress on both the active force and the reserve force.”

-         Rep. John McHugh, House Armed Services Personnel Subcommittee Chairman May 2005

Trait 4 states LDHD commanders compensate for not having enough of what they need.  One way is to use strategic reserves for current requirements. This is like paying today’s bills with savings.

As demand increases, reserves are employed with increasing frequency as operational reserves, forces used regularly to support active duty military operations at home and abroad. If a community cannot meet sustained AEF obligations without the reserve component, then it has an operational reserve.

Logically, operational reserves have higher PERSTEMPO.  Therefore, traits 8 & 9 would increase reserve component brittleness as retention and turnover place further stress on narrow training pipelines.

Sometimes, reserve forces are disbanded altogether so needed equipment can be used by active forces. In the long run this conversion strategy, cannibalization, hurts both the reserve and active components.

Reserve manpower is usually lost or transferred to other weapon systems – it rarely converts directly to the active component. This further stresses narrow training pipelines, per trait , as they struggle to increase active manpower to fill the converted reserve platforms. Fewer reserve units now exist to retain separating active duty personnel, making Trait 9 even worse. Subsequently, their experience is lost.

If a weapon system has no strategic or operational reserve, or is cannibalizing its reserves then it has attained operational overreach. This exacerbates Trait 3 and 6. These forces may be overwhelmed in the event of unexpected and sustained contingencies - a rainy day comes and the savings account, the strategic reserve, has been spent.  

11. LDHD forces are risk averse. 

No man is worth his salt who is not ready at all times to risk his body, to risk his well being, to risk his life, in a great cause."
   - Theodore Roosevelt 

More so than properly balanced forces, LDHD communities foster heightened cultures of risk management. LDHD commanders are understandably reluctant to risk these precious assets. Risk management is a cornerstone in any military organization, but LDHD communities sometimes take it a step further and become risk averse. Risk aversion surfaces operationally, culturally, and strategically.  

Operational risk aversion manifests itself with several behaviors. On their own, these behaviors are not always wrong, but in risk averse organizations they are often applied inappropriately. First, the ‘most-conservative response rule’ (always follow the most conservative course of action) is usually taken, even when other properly risk-managed courses of action would be more effective. Next, decisions and subsequent actions are delayed until every possible variable is known, considered, and weighed, even in time critical situations. Decision authority is often pushed to higher levels, even when not appropriate.

Often regulatory overhead increases to the point where instructions become overly detailed and inflexible. In extreme situations, decisions may be delayed to the point of self-imposed operational paralysis.

Culturally risk averse organizations can no longer find creative ways to meet mission demands. They operate in ‘survival mode’ with fatigued personnel unwilling to allocate precious resources to effect change, no matter how promising. As these organizations become more conservative, there are fewer incentives for change.  Finally, communication breaks down as PERSTEMPO increases; time and opportunities to exchange ideas decrease as workload increases; and creative thinking withers.

Long-term planning suffers in creatively barren organizations. Strategically risk averse units become stagnant, focus on immediate goals and are less receptive to new ideas. At this point an LDHD organization can no longer compensate as detailed in trait 4 and is in true crisis. When taken to an extreme, these organizations may become risk intolerant - in practice they accept no risk except those explicitly defined in regulatory guidance.  In such cases, personal initiative and autonomy are discouraged in all instances, even combat. 

Using the 11 Traits.

Unlike the official static definition, these traits are comprehensive, dynamic, and interrelated. But what good are they? First, they give Airmen, especially those in non-designated LDHD weapon systems, awareness of a problem. Because that’s exactly what LDHD is: a problem.

Awareness is necessary for understanding. These traits provide a vocabulary to understand why and how LDHD forces behave the way they do.

With awareness and understanding, commanders can then manage the acute effects inherent to LDHD systems. For starters, commanders can identify the policies which create and perpetuate their weapon system’s LDHD status. They can also accurately quantify weapon system delicateness and brittleness; good metrics are critical when requesting additional resources. Commanders can also gain organizational and technological efficiencies without falling into the trap of increasing system delicateness. Policy makers can reduce weapons system brittleness by bolstering training pipelines and aggressively addressing retention. Finally, commanders can avoid the risk-aversion trap by reevaluating decision making and risk management processes. All of these are short-term fixes and are an extension of trait 4. They don’t solve the chronic problem.

Sometimes, there’s no suitable substitute for having more. The only real fix for chronic LDHD weapon systems is to increase force strength or decrease demand, and decreasing demand is not always an option. Why should policy makers concern themselves with this if they’ve accepted LDHD forces as a fact of life?

The more LDHD weapon systems a force has, the more that force is in a state of strategic overreach. The Global War on Terror (GWOT) is increasing pressure on both LDHD and non-LDHD communities. Now the Air Force is shrinking, cutting both personnel and weapon systems under the Force Shaping initiative.  As end-strength glides to 316,000 and the GWOT continues unabated, Airmen serving in weapon systems not officially defined as LDHD will find they share more and more in common with their LDHD brethren. Unabated, it becomes systemic and the entire service will begin to exhibit LDHD traits, becoming an LDHD Air Force. Such an air force would be overextended and highly vulnerable.

“Therefore, a smaller army that is inflexible will be captured by a larger one.”

- Sun Tzu

Conclusion

These 11 traits are just that, traits, not quantifiable metrics. They are theories, not laws, of how these organizations behave.  Overworked units, with or without an LDHD designation, need a lexicon from which to work. This conceptual framework gives form and voice to what many Airmen are experiencing but haven’t been able to express. In this light I hope this will help readers see if their weapon system is effectively LDHD or not.

As stewards of American airpower every Airman must look to the future. For those finding themselves in LDHD organizations, it’s important not only to be aware of the reasons and implications of being in an overextended weapon system, but what can be done about it. With awareness comes responsibility. In this paper, I detail some measures commanders can implement at the unit level[, but the real work is at the policy-making level. The Air Force has been at war for 17 years and is approaching its smallest force level since 1947.    This alone justifies more detailed studies on the long term health, culture, and viability of LDHD communities. More information is needed if we are to avoid becoming an LDHD Air Force.

I hope this generates open discussion and dialogue about what happens when too few have been asked to do too much, with too little, for too long.

REGARDING MANPOWER & ACCOUNTABLITY…

Congress just announced its new defense budget and guess what’s missing? About 11,500 Airmen. The Air Force is only authorized 317,050 manpower positions, not the 328,600 promised by Secretary of Defense Gates. This is because someone sort of ‘forgot’ to ask congress for the additional cash. Really, someone actually forgot to ask.

No big deal, at least according to service officials. In time of war there isn’t an ‘end strength’ cap, so they can keep to positions…if they can find the money. I doubt congress will be very generous after dropping over $700 billion on bad loans this weekend. Many not know this, but even before the massive bailout plan the defense budget was already slated to shrink. According to InsideDefense.com the White House “assumed the base budget -- adjusted for inflation -- will decline in FY-10 and continue to shrink through FY-13…projected ‘negative growth’ in defense spending.” No, the only way we’ll get cash for bodies is to take it out of hide. This means cutting other programs, but what’s left to cut? 

In what is being hailed as ‘great leadership’ Gen Schwartz spoke at the 2008 Air & Space Conference demanding greater accountability in ‘all matters large and small.’ I think someone forgetting to ask for money for 11,500 bodies qualifies as a large matter.

REGARDING ACQUISITIONS…

In the same Air Force Time article there was a little blurb at the end stating congress is directing the service to keep 74 retired KC-135 tankers ‘ready to fly.’ The Shreveport Times reported on 16 September the service is considering starting the new tanker bidding process anew.  These two items, in technical terms, are known as ‘Bad Ju Ju.’ They mean don’t hold you breath on a new tanker.

The CSAR-X Air Force Helicopter program continues to flounder. This is from the 18 September Wall Street Journal:

The Pentagon may hold off on awarding a $15 billion U.S. Air Force rescue-helicopter contract this fall if it is likely that the losing bidders could successfully protest the decision for a third time, the Pentagon's top weapons buyer said Wednesday.

During an interview, John Young, the Defense Department's top weapons buyer, said he had no reason right now to believe the selection won't pass muster, but his office isn't taking any chances. "If we think there's risk there, it won't go forward," he said.

The Air Force can’t buy satellites either. According to the 22 September Bloomberg.com the awarding of the Transformational Communications Satellite has been delayed again. It was originally slated for launch in 2009. They’ll be lucky for a 2015 launch date now. According to Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisitions John Young, “(The Air Force is) playing budget games'' … ``We are letting budget processes deter efficient execution of acquisition programs that are trying to meet (valid needs).”

No tanker, no helicopter, no satellites. No future?

REGARDING COMBAT OPERATIONS…

A few days ago I predicted the bailout plan would have dire implications for defense spending, including sustaining combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Apparently, I’m not alone in that assessment. This comes from the 27 September San Diego Union-Tribune:

In an interview, Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari said a precipitous withdrawal could have consequences for the country and the region that everyone would regret afterward.

China just successfully completed its first spacewalk mission. NASA will retire the space shuttle in about 36 months. The US will have no manned space launch vehicle for the foreseeable future and will hitch rides with our dear friends the Russians.

PARTING THOUGHTS…

Is anyone paying attention? Does anyone get it?  I don’t think so. At the recent Air and Space Conference all the service’s 4-star generals held an open forum. You can read the transcript here. To summarize, they said their systems are old and they need more money. Agreed. Then moderator asked them ‘if you had one more dollar to spend, what would you spend it on?” Each general responded with an item important to his command. 

It seems to me they are unable to spend the money they have right now. Literally unable. What good are billions of dollars if you can’t successfully bid a contract?

Last week the US Government absorbed almost a trillion dollars of the most noxious corporate debt imaginable. To put it in perspective, the government has an annual operating budget of about three trillion dollars and only takes in about 2.7 trillion in revenue. This new debt is equivalent to almost three annual defense budgets! Overnight, the US federal debt leapt by at least a ten percent. Whatever budget estimates and expectations Pentagon leadership had up to this point can be thrown out. It’s a new fiscal ball game.

In my article, “Entitlements Threaten Defense Spending” (Townhall Magazine, September 2008) I likened entitlement spending, like Medicare, to a tsunami of red ink poised to crush the defense budget. With this week’s unprecedented corporate bailout packages our nation effectively ran out to meet that giant wave.  If the republic is to survive something will have to give.

That something will be defense, the biggest slice of the non-discretionary federal budget. Congress and the next president will have to cut federal spending in order to service this new debt. If they don’t, they risk potentially destroying America’s currency and credit rating – bad, very bad. 

Those staffers will tell the Pentagon budget planners (those working on something called the ‘POM’) to start planning deep cuts. They’ll give these planners draconian bottom lines and tell them to meet them - period. The planners will start a series of budget drills and the real fun begins.

Over the next few months rumors of the deep budget cuts will seep outside the Pentagon. Small programs, big programs – nothing will be sacred. The defense budget will be so different next year it as to be almost unrecognizable.

The Air Force will get hit hardest since it’s currently the least favored branch among the political elites. Since the new aerial tanker was punted to the next administration it’s uniquely vulnerable. I believe by this time next year it will be on indefinite hold and some token funds will be thrown at the old KC-135 to extend its life a few more years.  Don’t hold your breath on a new replacement rescue helicopter. I believe that program is doomed now. Expect early retirement for various weapons systems those with high operating costs, perhaps like the B-1 bomber.  

I cannot speak to the specifics of the other services, but they’ll get hit hard, too. Even the Army and the Marines, the most engaged in combat operations, will feel the heat. It won’t just be weapons acquisition programs, either. Personnel program cuts will be close behind.

I’m not talking about tweaks in the system, but sudden and draconian cuts. It will start with pronouncements on cutting travel costs. Then they’ll cut medical costs in new and painful ways. Tricare will eventually pay pennies on the dollar as co-pays for dependant medical care skyrockets. There will be drastic rollbacks in retiree medical benefits and huge shake-ups of the retirement system itself. Then the real cuts will begin.

The Navy and Air Force will resume their downward force cuts to unprecedented levels, perhaps in the range of 250,000 for each service. The additional forces added to the Marines and Army since 2003 will be rescinded. There may even be serious consideration of consolidating the services. I believe in 3-5 years we’ll find the military 25% smaller…at least.

With all these force cuts, how will we fight the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan?

We won’t. With this new, staggering debt load members of both political parties will accelerate our departure from Iraq and even Afghanistan, regardless of the political and military consequences. Only a token naval and air power component will remain in the Gulf Region to protect the oil. Expect withdrawal of forces from most of the Pacific and Europe as well.