…Now, sources tell us that OSD may actually chop an additional carrier from the Navy’s battle fleet, a move that would take the force down to nine carriers from the current total of 11…Skipping a future carrier purchase doesn’t save money now. Cutting one flattop from the existing force would.

…For one, the Navy is required by law to maintain 11 carriers… when former CSBA naval analyst and now Navy under secretary, Bob Work, gave his shipbuilding brief earlier this year, he said that if forced by a constrained shipbuilding budget to trim the planned build, he would cut the carrier force to 9.

Work’s former boss at CSBA, the influential Andrew Krepinevich, wrote in the July issue of Foreign Affairs in an article…carriers risk “operational irrelevance” as nations develop improved submarines and increasingly accurate, long-range anti-ship missiles that put the big flattops at risk. (emphasis mine)

Krepinevich’s argument missile technology and submarine proliferation makes flattops irrelevant are the same arguments from the 1970s, when the left tried to kill America’s super carrier programs. How does this make any sense? Aren’t these conventional capabilities the very threats the modern carrier is designed to combat? A third world fleet with a few electric diesels and some shore-to-ship missiles are a pale reflection of the Soviet Fleet at its height (which dared not directly engage a super carrier task force).

The simliar arguments are now turned against the F-22, like in this article from this morning’s Time.com by Mark Thompson:

The Air Force spent years fighting to keep building the $350 million F-22 fighter, an airplane crammed with so much gee-whiz technology there's a law barring it from being sold to any other nation. But since no other nation is building such a plane to challenge it, the F-22 has become a costly investment with an uncertain payoff...now the service is seeking 100 slower, lower-flying and far cheaper airplanes — most likely prop-driven — that it can use to kill insurgents today and use to train local pilots — such as Afghans or Iraqis — tomorrow.

The list of requirements for what the Air Force is calling its Light Attack Armed Reconnaissance plane is fairly basic, and ... must be capable of flying 900-mile missions at up to 200 miles per hour (compared with up to 1500 mph for the F-22), including at night and poor weather. It will carry guns and rockets, along with a pair of 500-pound bombs, according to an Air Force solicitation issued last month. It will have to fly to and from dirt airfields where the only ground support is fuel...

Planes likely to vie for the contract — slated to begin flying in 2012 —include the Kansas-built Hawker Beechcraft T-6, currently the Air Force's basic trainer... This emphasis on down-and-dirty warfare is a real change for the Air Force, which for years has been hyper-focused on building the most sophisticated fighter planes in the world. The military blog Danger Room recently quoted from Air Force studies dating back to 2005 that spoke of the service's "pre-occupation with procurement of the F-22" at the expense of counter-insurgency missions, and its "nasty habit of forgetting the hard-learned lessons of irregular operations..."

The Air Force's new top officer has said this low-tech aircraft "is really consistent with Secretary Gates' thinking" in favor of simple weapons that can be bought quickly and perform more than one mission. A rugged and simple warplane that can be flown against insurgents by U.S. pilots who also train foreign pilots in their own language "is a very attractive way to approach this problem," General Norton Schwartz, the Air Force chief of staff, said in April.

His civilian boss concurs. Air Force Secretary Michael Donley recently said that such a plane "will help build up the security capabilities of partners facing counter-terrorist operations, counter-insurgency operations." Nations like Afghanistan and Iraq "are not going to be able to — and do not have a need to — operate at that higher end of the conflict spectrum," he added. Nor can they afford to — the $350 million used to buy each of the 187 F-22s will pay for a fleet of about 50 of these planned counter-insurgency warplanes.

First, Mr. Thompson’s assertion that “no other nation is building such a plane to challenge(the F-22)” is dead wrong. How can someone write for a major magazine and blatantly get such a basic fact wrong?About 2 minutes on Google turned up these facts on a challenger to the F-22:

“The PAK FA (or PAK-FA) is a Russian fifth-generation fighter jet ...intended to replace the MiG-29 and Su-27 in the Russian Air Force...”

“On 07 July 2008 Air Force commander Col. Gen. Alexander Zelin said "We will begin test flights [of the new fighter] in 2009, and hope to receive the aircraft in 2013".

The left made the same arguments in the 1970s when they tried to kill the F-15 as “too expensive and too complex.” Thirty years later the mighty F-15 is considered by most has the most successful fighter plane in history. Now the left wants the Air Force to get rid of its premiere fighter capability because there are no peer competitors and it wants the Navy to cut back on its premiere surface capability because there are peer competitors. This is laughable.

The Air Force must make every dollar it spends count. This means pursuing multi-role platforms, like the F-35 and F/A-22 (yes, it was once called the “F/A” for both fighter and attack). These can be used for both air defense and close air support. A little modified T-6 cannot perform ANY other mission than light counter insurgency ops. In this role it will be fodder for AAA (anti-aircraft artillery) and MANPAD (man portable air defense) missiles in any theater of war. The Air Force already has counter-insurgency capabilities it can expand on in the form of the venerable A-10 and the new Reaper UAV. Why not buy more of these?

These arguments are simply smoke screens for cutting weapon systems to fund domestic initiatives. We are repeating the Hollow Force concept under the Carter Administration in the wake of LBJ’s massive “Great Society” domestic programs. In the wake of these decisions we are stripping America of its ability to project strategic power and defend our nation from afar.

Secretary of Defense Gates recently discussed the cancellation of the CSAR-X rescue helicopter program with a group of Air Force officers.

“Frankly, the notion of an unarmed helicopter going 250 miles behind enemy lines by itself to rescue somebody didn’t seem like a realistic op-con,” he said.

If it wasn’t realistic for a helicopter to go alone 250 miles behind enemy lines then US Special Operations Command would have shutdown years ago. Since Vietnam, both special operations and rescue helicopter crews have perfected the art of flying alone and unafraid into enemy territory. Even if it was unrealistic, combat rescue helicopters seldom go alone, but instead operate as part of a combat search and rescue task force, which may include platforms such as unmanned systems, A-10s, and AC-130s.

The secretary also stated the Defense Department would continue to look to improve CSAR, but as a joint operation.  

CSAR, however, is already a joint operation. Because Air Force CSAR assets are low density and high demand they must lean heavily on other services for support. It’s not uncommon for Air Forced HH-60Gs to fight in conjunction with Army Apaches or Marine Corp Cobras or F/A-18s. This joint emphasis is one reason the other services often choose Air Force assets as their first choice for personnel recovery.  If the other services wanted a bigger piece of CSAR it would have happened before now.

The Army, Navy and Marine Corps pour billions into aviation programs they deem important, and vigorously engage in political turf battles to protect them.  The other services have far more helicopters than the Air Force and each, to some extent, dabble in personnel recovery. If they determined CSAR was critical to their operations they could have easily invested more resources and made a serious push to take CSAR from the Air Force. Instead, they’ve been willing to let the Air Force do the heavy lifting for personnel recovery for the same fundamental reason the Secretary of Defense is willing to axe it.

CSAR doesn’t put bombs on target, conquer enemy territory or sink enemy ships. It doesn’t directly add to combat capability, but is an insurance policy for those who do. The Air Force has been willing to foot this expensive bill since Vietnam and the other services have been more than willing to let them do it. Times are tough and the Pentagon is looking for ways to save money, lowering this insurance coverage is one way to do it.

If the rest of the military wasn’t willing to spend the money to bring their assets up to full CSAR capability in the good times, why would they allocate precious resources in the hard times? Just calling CSAR “a joint mission” won’t guarantee one more dime for this most critical of missions.

Gates made his statement to Congress yesterday on his plan for defense spending with few surprises. Let’s revisit my predictions:

1. Some defense spending will remain strong, even as the budget shrinks. This will only be for certain mature programs and only in key democratic districts. 

Defense spending will increase by 4% in real dollars. That’s about par with inflation (depending on whose inflation numbers one uses), though smaller than the service chiefs asked for.

The F-35 program will increase. The tanker program survives. The Navy can keep its 11-carrier fleet and buy more F/A-18s. Its new destroy will be scaled back, not cut, and it can resume building Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. The Army’s future combat system will also be scaled back. The Marines will lose the new presidential helicopter program but, with the Army, will boost force strength. Special operations and intelligence assets also get a big boost.

Now its congresses turn. In the end they have the final say. I think they will go along with most (but not all) of Gates’ recommendations due to tremendous pressure from the White House. Any changes will be to align spending and programs with districts of the democratic majority. We will know for sure by fall of this year.

2. 'Big programs, small programs, nothing will be sacred. Expect early retirement for various weapon systems. This will not impact democratic districts. Don’t hold your breath on a new rescue helicopter unless the HH-47 wins. Parts of it are made in Murtha’s state of PA.

Murtha was out with knee surgery and the entire Air Force rescue helicopter went down in flames. In fact, only the Air Force took major force-wide hits. Only its tanker program made it out unscathed (the F-35 is a joint program with Navy, Marines and U.K.). The F-22 was terminated – no more will be built. The C-17 was terminated – no more will be built. Missile defense – gutted. The new bomber – scrapped. New transformational satellite program – scrapped. Over 200 front line fighters – retired. It was another bad day for the Air Force.

3. Rep. Barney Frank’s comment about a 25% cut in overall defense spending will come true, but not in the baseline budget. Expect the wartime supplemental spending to plummet as troops come home from Iraq.

Supplemental spending debate doesn’t begin in earnest until later this spring…more to follow here.

What do I think about all these changes Sec. Gates is making? I’m still digesting his proposals, but I don’t think he had much choice. I’ll discuss this in more detail later.